Paul P. T., SBI# 309413B, 1W
Pro se
Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center
8 Production Way
Avenel, NJ 07001W.W., SBI# 288526C, 1W
Pro se
Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center
8 Production Way
Avenel, NJ 07001
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CIVIL ACTION
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P.T., W.W., et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DEVON BROWN, et al,
Defendants.
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CLASS ACTION
No. ______________
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER |
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
TABLE OF AUTHORIES
FEDERAL CASES
STATE CASES
RULES
STATUTES
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
ARGUMENT POINT I The Plaintiff Is Entitled To A Temporary Restraining Order And A
Preliminary Injunction
A. The Plaintiff is threatened with irreparable harm
B. The Balance of Hardships favors the Plaintiffs
C. The Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits
D. The relief sought will serve the public interest
POINT II The Plaintiff Should Not Be Required To Post Security
FEDERAL
CASES Duran v. Anaya, 642 F.Supp. 510 (D.N.M. 1986)
<Locate> <Locate>
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) <Locate>
Howard v. Evans, 922 F.2d712{11thCir. 1991) <Locate>
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3M Cir. 1979)
<Locate>
J.L. v Parham, 412 F .Supp. 112 (D.Ga. 1976) <Locate>
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) <Locate>
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) <Locate>
Llewelyn v. Oakland County
Prosecutor's Office, 402 F.Supp. 1379 (E.D.Mich. 1975)
<Locate>
Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804 (2nd Cir. 1984)
<Locate> <Locate>
Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371 (6d1 Cir. 1989)
<Locate>
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F.Supp. 351 (C.D.Cal.1982)
<Locate>
Philips v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 731 F.Supp. 792 (W.D.Mich.
1990) <Locate>
Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1990)
<Locate>
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) <Locate>
Williams v. Lane, 646 F.Supp. 1379 (N.D.Ill. 1986)
<Locate>
Zinermon v. Burch,
110 S.Ct. 975 (1990) <Locate> STATE CASES
B.D. v. Carley, 307 N.J.
Super. 259 (App.Div. 1988) <Locate>
IMO Comrnitment of R.S.,
173 N.J. 134 (2002) <Locate>
IMO Rules Regarding Inmate-Therapist
Confidentiality, 224 N.J. Super. 252 (App.Div. 1988)
<Locate> <Locate>
State v. Cavallo,
88 N.J. 508 (1982) 8 State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517 (2000)
<Locate>
State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) <Locate>
State v. Raso, 321 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div.1999)
<Locate> RULES
Fed.R.Civ.P.
23 <Locate>
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c) <Locate>
New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702 <Locate> STATUTES
42 U.S.C. § 1983 <Locate>
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27 3, 4, 7, 8 <Locate>
<Locate> <Locate>
<Locate> <Locate>
<Locate>
N.J.S.A. 52:14B <Locate> Statement of the Case This is a civil rights Class Action brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 by New Jersey State Prisoners housed at the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center (hereinafter "A.D. T .C."), the designated
facility in New Jersey for offenders who have been determined to be
compulsive and repetitive sexual offenders. The
complaint upon which this action is based alleges violation of Plaintiffs'
and class members' due process, equal protection and fundamental fairness
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and their rights to redress of grievances and access to the courts under
the First Amendment and their rights to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, who include state officials, private
subcontractors and their employees and independent contractors, failed to
ensure that proper protections were in place to guard against arbitrary
and capricious actions on the part of state or private contractor
employees or independent contractors in making determinations about which
soon-to-be-released inmates should be screened for civil commitment under
the New Jersey's Sexually Violent Predators Act (hereinafter "SVPA") as
codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4-27 et seq., and which inmates should be then
temporarily committed to the Special Treatment Unit (hereinafter "STU") at
Kearny, New Jersey, pending a final commitment hearing.
Specifically the complaint alleges that defendants' employ procedures,
policies and practices that deny
Plaintiffs any opportunity to challenge a referral for screening or a
determination that the inmate is a sexually violent predator, prior to the
deprivation of liberty attendant to commitment to a facility for such
predators, such deprivation being accomplished in violation of First
Amendment rights to redress grievances against the government and access
to the courts, and in violation of Plaintiffs' due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The complaint also alleges that the absence of policies and procedures
adopted through the Administrative Procedures Act N.J.S.A. 52:14B-l
through 12 (hereinafter "APA"), for the referral and screening process,
denies due process protection of Plaintiffs' rights. The complaint further
alleges that the Defendants failed to adhere to accepted standards of
practice in the administration of scientifically validated instruments
designed to assist in predictions of recidivism, thus rendering their
decisions to commit in an arbitrary and capricious manner, in violation of
Due Process rights and Fundamental Fairness.
The complaint alleges that defendants conspired to sustain a high rate of
civil commitment based on factors other than a scientifically and
professionally grounded basis for commitment recommendations. Next the
complaint alleges that the state statute that eviscerates inmate-therapist
and inmate-psychiatrist confidentiality for those
inmates being considered for civil commitment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.27(b),
violates due process and fundamental fairness as well as 8th Amendment
protections against cruel and unusual punishment, as applied
retro-actively to communications which have already occurred and were
previously privileged, and prospectively to communications yet to occur.
The complaint also alleges that the defendants violated Plaintiffs' rights
to due process and equal protection, as well as fundamental fairness by
denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to preserve the evidence of a
psychiatric screening for commitment via electronic recording.
In addition, the complaint alleges that the existence and reliance upon an
"Inmate Release Committee", made up of staff members who are unlicensed,
uncertified, and untrained in medicine or any allied mental health field,
in general, or in the evaluation, diagnosis and treatment of sex
offenders, in particular, for making decisions about the need for
screening of sex offenders for commitment, constitutes malicious abuse of
process in contravention of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United State Constitution.
Finally, the complaint charges that defendants have consistently and
repeatedly violated accepted standards of practice and ethics governing
the professions of medicine, psychiatry and psychology, and in so doing
displayed deliberate indifference to the medical and
psychiatric/psychological needs of inmates in violation of the Eighth
Amendments prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Statement of Facts
As detailed in the complaint and in the declaration supplied by named
Plaintiff P.T., in support of this TRO motion, Plaintiffs are inmates
currently housed at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center where they
have been participating in treatment. Each is subject to civil commitment
under the SVPA and each has been informed by staff that they are likely
to be screened for civil commitment or have been so screened.
Plaintiff P. T. is scheduled to max out and be released on May 2, 2003 at
the expiration of his term. P.T. is the brother of JESSE TIMMENDEQUAS, a
previously convicted sex offender and former inmate at A.D.T.C., who
raped and murdered Megan Kanka in 1994. The ensuing public outcry over the
Plaintiff's brother's crimes led to a series of laws, first in New Jersey
and then nationally, known as Megan's Laws, which mandated sex offender
registration and varying degrees of community notification, and ultimately
lead to the passage of the Sexually Violent Predators Act. The SVPA seeks
to commit sex offenders who have completed their state prison term, to a
long-term care treatment facility (currently housed at the Special
Treatment Unit at Kearny New Jersey), if, after first a preliminary
determination and then a subsequent full hearing, it is determined the
offender is a sexually violent predator (N.J.S.A. 30:4-27 et seq.).
Subsequent to the implementation of that act, Defendants instituted a
process by which inmates nearing the end of their prison term, could be
referred for possible psychiatric screening, be screened by said
psychiatrists, and upon the determination of at least two psychiatrists
who concur that the inmate is a sexually violent predator, obtain an order
of temporary commitment by presenting clinical certificates affirming the
psychiatrists' conclusions, to a court of competent jurisdiction
(hereinafter referenced as the "civil commitment screening process").
The cornerstone of the civil commitment screening process is the Inmate
Release Committee (hereinafter "IRC"), an extra-legal body of lay citizens
with no professional training or certification in mental health or medical
fields, which meets and operates in secret. Its decisions are unreviewable
and unappealable, insulated even from judicial scrutiny. This lay body may
overrule the professionally derived opinions of a licensed psychiatrist,
without justification and without contrary psychiatric evidence to support
their decisions. Absent statutorily granted authority, the IRC
significantly controls plaintiffs' destiny without even providing notice
of their anticipated consideration of an inmate's release status. Absent
said notice, plaintiffs' liberty interests (as identified at length
hereinafter) attaches at the moment the inmate is put on notice by any
staff member that he is likely to be screened.
In an attempt to secure evidence that might be used in any future
commitment hearing, Plaintiffs and class members have requested that the
screening evaluations be electronically recorded, a request that is always
denied. Moreover, the psychiatrist who conducts the evaluation is
frequently the same psychiatrist who serves on the treatment team of the
individual at A.D.T.C., a conflict of interest prohibited by nationally
accepted medical standards and commonly known as a "dual relationship." The
complaint also alleges that confidentiality of the inmate-therapist and
inmate-psychiatrist relationship is often violated in the screening
process, engendering great harm in the form of emotional distress and loss
of trust in the therapeutic relationship.
Once the commitment order is signed, the inmate is usually transferred to
the STU immediately, or within a few days. No notice is provided to an
inmate of any of the steps in this process or when or if the state will
seek to present clinical certificates to the court, (except for the
obvious fact that when summoned before a psychiatrist to be screened, the
purpose of the screening is sometimes, but not always revealed to the
inmate).
Perhaps most egregious, though, is evidence that defendants have conspired
to sustain a high rate of civil commitment so as to satisfy public outrage
over past acts of sex offenders who recidivated. The complaint alleges
that A.D.T.C. may be committing 3-4 times as many individuals as are
likely to reoffend if released. Toward that goal, the complaint alleges
that some defendants have inflated scores on the main actuarial scale used
to estimate risk of reoffense, the MnSOST-R, by deviating from the
scale's scientifically validated scoring criteria.
In the case of Plaintiff P.T., as recounted extensively in his
declaration, some of the defendants and numerous other staff members have
indicated that he is being screened for commitment predominately because
of his name, that is, because he is the brother of JESSE TIMMENDEQUAS who
awaits execution of his death sentence in state prison.
Plaintiff P.T. alleges that in his case in particular, Defendants
Harris, Siegel and Shnaidman have conspired to have him committed because
of his name, and have acted to inflate his risk of reoffending. In the
specific case of Defendants Harris and Siegel, statements made by them
reveal an intent to deviate from the accepted scoring standards on the
MnSOST-R so as to inflate the scores of inmates they rate. That
inflation, in the case of Plaintiff
P.T., placed him in a high risk category whereas an accurate rating
would result in a score in the low risk category. Moreover, Defendants
Harris, Siegel and Shnaidman have repeatedly violated professional
prohibitions against
dual relationships by serving both as a member of Plaintiffs' treatment
teams and as the screening psychiatrist hired by the state to determine if
the Plaintiff is a sexually violent predator.
Plaintiff P.T. and as many as 3-5 other class members are scheduled to
max out and be released within the next 30-60 days. All have been or are
at risk of being subjected to the arbitrary and capricious referral and
screening process complained of herein.
Once an inmate has been screened by at least two psychiatrists, as has
occurred with Plaintiff P.T., they may be removed from the building at
any time prior to their release date and transferred to the STU. Such
transfers occur without notice, and Plaintiff typically is unaware whether
two clinical certificates certifying him as a sexually
violent predator have been signed and a order of temporary commitment
received, until he is secured and escorted out of the building in
restraints.
Once Plaintiff has been removed from the building and transferred to STU,
his protected liberty interest has
been violated and the irreparable harm this complaint seeks to avert will
have occurred. Once at STU, plaintiff will lose all access to the federal courts, even most likely his ability to
communicate his change of address to the court. His property and legal
papers will be confiscated and returned to him on a selective basis at the
discretion of the treatment staff at STU. He will have no access to a law
library or any public assistance to prosecute his claim and is thus
restricted by statute and by practice from acting as a pro se litigant.
Consequently, defendants may effectively eliminate Plaintiff P.T. and
other similarly situated class members from any relief available under
this complaint by securing a temporary order of commitment in violation of
constitutional rights as alleged in this complaint, removing the
individual from the building and thus insulating themselves from
prosecution of a complaint. The probability of defendants effectuating the
transfer of any class members so as to render their 'legal action impotent
is real and calls for the requested temporary restraining order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
In determining whether a party is entitled to a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction, courts generally consider several
factors: whether the party will suffer irreparable injury, the "balance of
hardships " between the parties, the likelihood of success on the merits,
and the public interest. Each of these factors favors the grant of this
motion. = A. The Plaintiff is threatened with
irreparable harm.
Plaintiff P. T. and others similarly situated who are scheduled to max out
and be released in the next 30-60 days are facing immediate and
irreparable harm in several forms:
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denial of liberty;
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b. |
stigmatization as a sexually violent predator;
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c. |
psychological harm associated with such stigmatization and the
inevitable transfer to a secure facility for sexually violent predators;
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the psychological harm, mental distress, physical and mental stress,
anxiety and fear associated with being housed with other violent
offenders, many of whom come from state prisons other than the A.D.T.C.,
and consequently have received little or no psychological treatment to
ameliorate their violent tendencies;
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the psychological and physical stress associated with a prolonged
period of time of confinement while awaiting a [mal commitment hearing
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f. |
the psychological hann, mental and physical distress associated with
deviations in standards of psychiatric and psychological care engendered by
wholesale violations of inmate-therapist/psychiatrist confidentiality and
dual relationships whereby an inmate's psychiatrist suddenly "switches
teams" and becomes a State witness against the inmate. |
Inmates who are not referred for screening and who are not screened, are
released on their release date and are free to return to their homes,
their families, and their communities, resting secure in the knowledge
that they have paid their debt to society as they prepare for the
difficult, but gratifying, task of reintegrating into society. Inmates who
are referred for screening, and who are screened, face the very real
possibility of losing the freedom for which they have waited so long.
As declared in the complaint and declaration in support of this motion,
the risk is immediate, as the defendants can proceed against an inmate and
secure commitment without any prior notice to the inmate in a very short
period of time. As alleged in paragraph 46 of the Complaint, this is
exactly what happened in the case of Michael Newman, a former A.D.T.C.
inmate, who was screened and committed prior to his release date, and had
insufficient time to seek court intervention.
Given Plaintiffs' allegations in the accompanying complaint, the referral
and screening process is fundamentally and constitutionally flawed. The
risk of further arbitrary and capricious commitment of individuals who are
not high risk to reoffend, establishes the immediate and irreparable harm
that this Court can prevent by granting the relief requested.
From a legal perspective, numerous claims of constitutional violations are
tendered in this complaint, including violation of the First, Fourteenth
and Eighth Amendments.
The First Amendment claim arises from the policies and practices of the
Defendants whereby they insulate themselves, behind an extra-legal,
secretive and clandestine apparatus, the Inmate Release Committee, from
any
type of review, scrutiny or appeal, thus denying residents their First
Amendment rights to redress of grievances, and
access to the courts.
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection violations are
legion and encompass the entire civil commitment screening process. From
the failure of the defendants to promulgate rules, polices and procedures
as required by the New Jersey Administrative Procedures Act, to the
arbitrary and capricious manner in which inmates are screened, including
violations of accepted professional practice in the scoring of
scientifically validated instruments in order to inflate offender risk
assessments, to denial of opportunities to preserve evidence and discovery
by refusing to permit Plaintiffs electronic recordings of their
psychiatric screenings, to the conspiracy between and among defendants to
sustain a high rate of civil commitment, the violations of Plaintiffs'
rights beg for judicial intervention.
Perhaps no more telling evidence of the effect of the arbitrary and
capricious nature of the screening process to which inmates are being
exposed, is the huge discrepancy between actual rates of civil commitment
(35% of inmates released in 2001 were transferred to STU under an order of
temporary commitment) compared with the actual rates of sex offending
recidivism (recomission of a sexual crime) of approximately 9% for A.D. T
.C. releasees and 13.4% rate based on a study of 23,000 released
offenders). The actions of defendants, whereby they are committing to the
STU 3-4 times as many individuals as might be expected to commit a new sex
offense, clearly violates due process protections and far exceeds the authority of the state as recognized in
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002),
(wherein only those sex offenders with a mental abnormality or disorder
that causes a serious difficulty in their ability to control their
sexually deviant behavior, creating the likelihood they will commit
another sexual offense in the foreseeable future, are commitable). If less
than 9% of those inmates who are released from A.D.T.C. commit a new sex
offense, the discriminative standard in Crane is clearly not being met. The Eighth Amendment claims derive from a claim of deliberate
indifference on the part of defendants who are alleged to have knowingly
and maliciously engaged in a repeated pattern of behavior that is
proscribed by accepted professional standards of care, practice and ethics
for the fields of medicine, psychiatry and psychology. These include the
prohibition against dual relationships, and the unauthorized disclosure of
privileged and confidential information obtained in the course of a doctor/patient relationship.
Courts have found knowing violations of accepted standards of medical
practice to constitute deliberate indifference, and thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. (Howard v. Evans,
922 F.2d 712, 719 (11th Cir. 1991) ("the contemporary standards and
opinions of the medical profession are highly relevant in determining
what constitutes deliberate indifference"); Smith v. Jenkins, 919
F.2d
90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990) (care that "so deviated from professional
standards that it amounted to deliberate indifference"). The right of
inmates to receive reasonable medical care to meet their needs has
been recognized as applying to psychiatric or psychological needs as well (see
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v.
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3rd Cir. 1979). In New Jersey, the Appellate
Court has already found that violations of inmate-therapist
confidentiality, when
embodied in administrative code, "may violate the prisoners' eighth
amendment right to adequate psychological care."
IMO Rules Regarding
Inmate-Therapist Confidentiality, 224 N.J.Super. 252 (App.Div. 1988)
cert. denied, 113 N.J. 323 (1988). The Appellate Court in this case
clarified that, notwithstanding the fact that the therapist was
employed by the prison, the duty of care owed was to the prisoner. Thus
the Court observed:
The Court in Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398,401 (D.C.Cir.1955),
explained the role of the psychiatrist:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the
world. He exposes to the therapist, not only what his words directly
express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his
fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most persons who undergo a
psychotherapy know that this is
what will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on
that condition ... It would be too much to expect them to do so if they
knew that all they say — and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they
say-may be revealed to the whole world from the witness stand.
Applying these comments to the prison setting it is obvious that the
patient seeking help, or in the case of the sex offender committed to the
Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center such as Fitzgerald, who is required to
undergo a program of specialized treatment for his mental condition under
N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3, would be fearful if information disclosed by him to
his clinical practitioner will be revealed to prison authorities.
Id. at
262.
The implications of wholesale violations of confidential relationships and
the violation of inmate- therapist/psychiatrist trust inherent in a dual
relationship whereby the treating psychiatrist becomes the star witness
for the State in an adversarial proceeding, compels the conclusion that
immediate, irreparable and continuing harm will inure to the Plaintiffs
absent immediate injunctive relief by the court.
Continuing violations and deprivations of constitutionally guaranteed
rights constitutes immediate and
irreparable harm. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373, (1976). This principle
has been applied in prison litigation generally. See
Newsom v. Norris, 888
F.2d 371, 378 (6th Cir. 1989); Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748
F.2d 804, 806 (2nd
Cir. 1984); Williams v. Lane, 646 F.Supp. 1379, 1409 (N.D.Ill. 1986),
aff'd,
851 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 879 (1989), and
specifically in prison medical care cases. Philips v. Michigan Dept.
of Corrections, 731 F.Supp. 792, 801 (W.D.Mich. 1990), aff'd, 932
F.2d 969
(6th Cir. 1991). B. The Balance of Hardships favors the Plaintiffs
In deciding whether to grant TRO's and preliminary injunctions, courts ask
whether the suffering of the moving party if the motion is denied will
outweigh the suffering of the non-moving party if the motion is granted. See e.g.,
Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d, supra at 808 (holding that dangers
posed by prison crowding outweighed state's financial and administrative
concerns); Duran v. Anaya, 642 F.Supp. 510,527 (D.N.M. 1986) (holding that
prisoners' interest in safety and medical care outweighed state's interest
in saving money by cutting staff).
Here, Plaintiffs' liberty interest in walking out of prison on their
release dates are substantial, as are their interests in maintaining a
healthy psychological and mental status, and a sustaining a belief in the
sacred trust and confidence in the doctor/patient or therapist/patient
relationship as they return to the community and participate in mental
health counseling as part of their release plan.
By contrast, the defendants' hardship is minimal. Provision of electronic
recordings of psychiatric screening evaluations can be easily accomplished
with no significant additional expenditure since the necessary recording
equipment is already available within the A.D.T.C. Studio, and the costs
of blank audio and/or videotapes are minimal. While the defendants would
not be able to use certain psychiatric screenings already conducted to
secure an order of temporary civil commitment, the provisions of the TRO
could be quickly implemented by the Defendants. The Defendants would also
incur some minor commitment of administrative staff resources in
collecting the requisite records to be impounded by the order. The main
additional cost to the state would be payments for the independent
psychiatric screenings by Court appointed Special Master. However, this
cost is minimal compared to the cost to Plaintiffs associated with the
loss of their freedom, and moreover, would be more than made up for by the
prevention of even one (1) inappropriate and unnecessary civil commitment,
given the costs associated with housing a resident at STU for the period
intervening between the temporary order of commitment and the final
commitment order. C. The Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.
The Plaintiffs have a great likelihood of success on the merits. The
violations of Plaintiffs' rights fall squarely within the acts prohibited
by the United States Supreme Court. See Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480,
(1980) as well as Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S.Ct. 975 (1990). In
Zinermon, the
Court addressed a question similar in many respects to the Plaintiffs'
claims here. In Zinermon, the plaintiff employed a screening process to
admit and commit an individual to a state hospital for a period of several
months, prior to conducting a full hearing to determine if the individual
should be finally committed. The Court found liberty interests to attach
to even the temporary commitment period.
Florida chose to delegate to petitioner a broad power to admit patients to
Florida State Hospital (i.e., to
effect what, in the absence of informed consent, is a substantial
deprivation of liberty). Because petitioner had state authority to deprive
persons of liberty, the Constitution imposed on them the state's
concomitant duty to see that no deprivation occur without adequate
procedural safeguards.
Id. at 988.
It may be permissible constitutionally for a state to have a statutory
scheme like Florida's which give state officials broad powers and little
guidance in admitting mental patients. But when those officials fail to
provide constitutionally required procedural safeguards to a person whom
they deprive of liberty, the state officials cannot then escape liability
by invoking Parratt and Hudson.
Id. at 988.
There can be no question but that liberty interests attach to the civil
commitment screening process. Plaintiffs are subject to loss of freedom
and liberty for 20 to 180 days or more, before having an opportunity to be
heard at a final commitment hearing, whereas inmates not subject to the
Civil Commitment Screening Process are released into the community upon
their release date.
Furthermore, substantial liberty interests also attach as a consequence of
the Discharge Plan requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.3-B and 30:4-27.37. Even if the Court, at a final commitment hearing, determines that the
plaintiff is not a sexually violent predator in need of civil commitment
and orders his release, the statute requires for even
that individual a Discharge Plan drawn up by treatment staff.
Discharge Plans may impose significant restraints on varied liberty
interests including, but not limited to,
housing, employment, freedom of association, freedom of travel, compulsory
financial burdens in the form of mandated psychotherapy, and freedom of
speech and religion. Failure to comply with such a Discharge Plan may
result in the placement of the individual in a designated facility for the
custody, care and treatment of sexually violent predators.
N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.37.
Inmates nearing their release dates who are not subjected to the Civil
Commitment Screening Process, are not subject to the statutorily required
Discharge Plan, while any inmate is who is screened is at such risk, and
any inmate for whom the state secures two clinical certificates pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28 are subject to such Discharge Plans.
Moreover, the issue of a party's right to electronically record an
evaluation compelled by an opposing party in a civil action has already
been clearly decided in New Jersey. In B.D. v. Carley, 307 N.J. Super. 259
(App.Div. 1998), cert. denied, 113 N.J. 323 (1998) the court held:
We determine here that the defense psychologist does not have the right to
dictate the terms under which the examination shall be held. This is a
discovery psychological examination, not one in which plaintiff is being
treated. Plaintiffs right to preserve evidence of the nature of the
examination, the accuracy of the examiner's notes or recollections, the
tones of voice and the like outweigh the examiner's preference that there
be no recording device.
Id. at 262.
As civil commitment under SVPA is clearly a civil not a criminal action
[see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)], protections to which
parties are entitled attendant to a civil proceeding, apply to inmates
being considered for civil commitment. Indeed, the Plaintiffs' interest in preserving
evidence of the interview far exceeds any interest found compelling by the
Court in Carley, as here Plaintiffs' liberty is at stake. Finally, the violations of accepted standards of
medical/psychiatric/ psychological care are pervasive and clearly
acknowledged by the public statements of the defendants themselves
(especially with respect to "dual relationships" and violations of the scoring guidelines for the MnSOST-R). As noted above, such knowing and deliberate deviations from accepted professional standards
constitutes deliberate indifference as acknowledged by the cases cited above. The standards for admission of expert
testimony in New Jersey, generally under State v. Kelly, of 97 N.J.
178 (1984) and more explicitly with reference to SVPA evaluations in
IMO
Commitment of R.S., 173 N.J.
134 (2002) required the use of reliable and scientifically validated
instruments in support of an expert witness's claim. Deviation from such standards renders such testimony
inadmissible (see State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508 (1982); State v.
Fortin, 162 N.J. 517 (2000); State v. Raso, 321 N.J.
Super. 5 (App.
Div.1999) (where the court held deviation from accepted professional
standards in the scoring and interpretation of a psychological test
warranted exclusion of said testimony under New Jersey Rule of Evidence
702). A clinical certificate certifying sexually
violent predator status, constitutes scientific expert testimony under
Rule 702, and may not, therefore, be predicated upon methods which are
unreliable and inadmissible under that Rule. Thus, Plaintiff is likely to
prevail on that claim as well. D. The relief sought will serve the public interest.
The public interest is always served when the law is obeyed. In this case,
the grant of relief will serve the public interest because it is always in
the public interest for even prison officials to obey the law.
Duran v.
Anaya, 642 F.Supp. supra. ("Respect for law, particularly by officials
responsible for the administration of the state's correctional system, is
in itself a matter of the highest public interest."); see also
Llewelyn v.
Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F.Supp. 1379, 1393 (E.D.Mich.
1975) ("the Constitution is the ultimate expression of the public
interest").
Inmates are sentenced to A.D.T.C. for a course of specialized treatment
designed to address their sexually deviant behavior so that they may make
"an acceptable social adjustment to the community" upon their release. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5. As noted above in the references to
IMO Rules Regulating
Inmate-Therapist Confidentiality, 224 N.J. Super, supra, confidentiality
is a fundamental component of any successful therapeutic relationship,
whereby inmates may feel free to explore all aspects of their thoughts,
fantasies, emotions, experiences and interpersonal interactions that may
contribute to, or trigger, their deviancy. The public interest in the
ultimate release of sex offenders who have received medically,
psychiatrically and psychologically adequate services, thus increasing the
likelihood of their making an acceptable social adjustment to the
community, is self-evident.
The granting of relief will reestablish the confidence Plaintiffs must
have in the therapeutic alliances they form
with therapists and psychiatrist in order to fully benefit from the course
of specialized treatment offered at A.D. T.C.
POINT II
THE PLAINTlFF SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO POST SECURITY
Usually a litigant who obtains interim injunctive relief is asked to post
security. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c). However, the plaintiff is an indigent
prisoner and is unable to post security. The court has discretion to
excuse an impoverished litigant from posting security.
Orantes-Hernandez v.
Smith, 541 F.Supp. 351, 385, n. 30 (C.D.Cal.1982);
J.L. v Parham, 412
F.Supp. 112, 140 (D.Ga. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 442
U.S. 584,99 S.Ct. 2493 (1979). In view of the immediate and irreparable harm facing
Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs pray the Court grant the relief requested
without requiring the posting of security.
Date: ________________
|
_________________________
Paul P. T., Pro se |
Date: ________________ |
_________________________
W.W., Pro se |
|
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